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Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS
Peter K. Yu*
This Article focuses on the growing use of investor-state dispute
settlement (“ISDS”) in the intellectual property area and explores what
reforms can be undertaken to improve this mechanism. It begins by
highlighting the substantive problems posed by ISDS in this area. It
further examines the mechanism’s deleterious impact on the multilateral
intellectual property system built upon the TRIPS Agreement. This Article
then calls for greater crossfertilization between ISDS and the WTO
system. Specifically, it advances a two-tier proposal calling for
institutional reforms concerning arbitral panels while advocating the
establishment of a new ISDS appellate body. This proposal draws on both
the European Union’s proposal for the investment chapter in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement and the
existing WTO dispute settlement process. This Article concludes by
assessing the strengths and limitations of this proposal and offers some
preliminary responses to its critics.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) has
garnered considerable scholarly, policy, and media attention.1 Such
attention can be partly attributed to the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership2 (“TPP”) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership3 (“TTIP”). The TPP Agreement includes an investment
chapter featuring an ISDS mechanism4 similar to the one found in the
North American Free Trade Agreement5 (“NAFTA”) and other bilateral
and regional investment agreements.6 Similarly, the proposed TTIP
1. For the Author’s discussions of ISDS, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, InvestmentRelated Aspects]; Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY (Christophe Geiger ed., Edward
Elgar Publ’g, forthcoming 2018); Peter K. Yu, The Pathways of Multinational Intellectual Property
Dispute Settlement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PROPERTY: OF PHARMACEUTICALS,
TOBACCO, COMMODITIES AND OTHER MATTERS (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman
Sanders eds., Kluwer Law International, forthcoming 2018).
2. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (not yet in force) [hereinafter TPP
Agreement]. For the Author’s discussions of the TPP, see generally Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP
Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2013); Peter
K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in
GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MEGA-REGIONALS: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE
AND CONVERGENCE (Peng Shin-yi et al. ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g, forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter
Yu, Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of Copyright Normsetting in the
Asia-Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC? JUXTAPOSING
HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY (Susan Corbett & Jessica Lai eds., ANU Press, forthcoming
2018) [hereinafter Yu, Copyright Normsetting]; Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder
Intellectual Property Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16 (2012); Peter K. Yu, Thinking
About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement on Life Support), 21 SMU
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About TPP]; Peter K. Yu, TPP
and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129 (2014).
3. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (providing information about the
negotiations).
4. See TPP Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 9.18–.30 (providing for ISDS).
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 1115–1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (providing for ISDS).
6. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of
Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 10, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, 1748
U.N.T.S. 385 (providing for the settlement of investment disputes); Agreement Between the Swiss
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Agreement allows private investors involved in investor-state disputes to
seek compensation from sovereign states.7 In lieu of the traditional ISDS
mechanism, the European Union’s proposal for the investment chapter
(“EU Proposal”) specifically calls for the establishment of a new
investment court system.8
Since the early 2010s, the growing use of ISDS to address international
disputes involving intellectual property investments has also dominated
the public debate. For instance, Philip Morris used the mechanism to
challenge the tobacco control measures in Uruguay and Australia, taking
advantage of the bilateral agreements these host states have set up with
Switzerland and Hong Kong, respectively. 9 Likewise, Eli Lilly utilized
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA to seek compensation for the Canadian courts’
invalidation of its patents on the hyperactivity drug Strattera
(atomoxetine) and the anti-psychotic drug Zyprexa (olanzapine).10
Interestingly, many of the ISDS-related developments have since
paused or slowed down considerably. The TPP, along with its investment
chapter, has been seemingly placed on life support11 following the United
States’ withdrawal from the partnership at the beginning of the Trump
administration.12 The eleven remaining TPP partners have since explored
ways to move the pact forward without the United States’ participation,
creating what is now called the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—or “CPTPP,” for short.13 As
Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Switz.-Uru., art. 10, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389 (addressing disputes between
a contracting party and an investor of the other contracting party).
7. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN UNION’S PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION
AND
RESOLUTION
OF
INVESTMENT
DISPUTES
(2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf
[hereinafter
TTIP
INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL] (advancing the EU Proposal).
8. Id. at § 3, art. 10(2).
9. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012–12, Notice of
Claim (June 22, 2011); Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010).
10. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration,
¶ 4 (Sept. 12, 2013).
11. See Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 2, pt. II (discussing the seemingly life support
status of the TPP Agreement).
12. See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the TransPacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017) (directing the
United States Trade Representative “to provide written notification to the Parties and to the
Depository of the TPP . . . that the United States withdraws as a signatory of the TPP and withdraws
from the TPP negotiating process”).
13. See TPP and CPTPP: The Differences Explained, N.Z. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/cptpp2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017) (explaining the differences
between the TPP and the CPTPP).
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to the TTIP, the negotiations between the European Union and the United
States had been suspended, or indefinitely stalled, even before the
departure of the Obama administration.14
As if these setbacks were not frustrating enough for those advocating
the greater use of ISDS in the intellectual property area, the case filed by
Philip Morris against Australia was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction in
December 2015.15 Meanwhile, the arbitrators in the other case found for
Uruguay, as opposed to the tobacco giant.16 In March 2017, Canada also
prevailed in its NAFTA investment dispute with Eli Lilly, handing host
states complete victories in all three recent intellectual property-related
ISDS cases.17
Notwithstanding these major setbacks to private investors and their
supportive governments, the ongoing developments seem to suggest that
ISDS is here to stay and will soon return to the intellectual property
arena.18 After all, ISDS issues have remained important in the ongoing
negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership19
(“RCEP”) and the proposed renegotiation of NAFTA.20 The EU proposal
14. See Jim Zarroli, German Official Says U.S.-Europe Trade Talks Have Collapsed, Blames
Washington, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/08/28/491721332/german-official-says-u-s-europe-trade-talks-have-collapsed-blameswashington (reporting the collapse of the TTIP negotiations).
15. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012–12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 588 (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Philip Morris v. Australia
Award]; see also supra text accompanying note 9 (discussing Philip Morris’ ISDS complaint
against Australia).
16. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award,
¶ 235 (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay Award]; see also supra text
accompanying note 9 (discussing Philip Morris’ ISDS complaint against Uruguay).
17. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, ¶ 480 (Mar.
16, 2017) [hereinafter Eli Lilly Final Award]; see also supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing
Eli Lilly’s ISDS complaint against Canada).
18. See Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1122 (2014) [hereinafter
Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?] (noting that ISDS arbitrations involving
intellectual property disputes represent “not only a new frontier in investment arbitration, but more
importantly, uncharted territory in the increasingly complex and contested landscape of
international intellectual property obligations”); Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at
835 (“[I]nvestment law has now rudely entered the intellectual property domain.”).
19. See 2015 Oct 16 Version: RCEP Draft Text for Investment Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:19 PM), http://keionline.org/node/2474 (providing the leaked October 16,
2015, text of the draft RCEP investment chapter). For the Author’s discussions of the RCEP, see
generally Yu, Copyright Normsetting, supra note 2; Yu, Crossvergence, supra note 2; Peter K. Yu,
The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673
(2017).
20. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR
THE
NAFTA
RENEGOTIATION
9
(2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf; see also David
Dayen, Trump’s Renegotiation of NAFTA Is Starting to Look a Lot Like the TPP, NATION (July 18,
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for the TTIP investment chapter has also been incorporated into recent
bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements.21
Thus, when all of the recent ISDS-related activities are taken into
consideration, there is a growing need for a closer look at the activities
lying at the intersection of intellectual property and investment. If ISDS
is to be used more widely and frequently in the intellectual property area,
we will need to develop a better understanding of the mechanism—in
particular, why it does or does not work well with the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.22 We will also need to explore
how the ISDS mechanism can be improved. In fact, if we do not start
paying attention now, it may be too late to do so should ISDS become
more widely and frequently used in the intellectual property area.23
There are certainly those who believe that ISDS does not belong in the
intellectual property arena.24 I am actually quite sympathetic to that
position, especially in regard to issues involving obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights25
(“TRIPS Agreement”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
However, acquiring a deeper understanding of ISDS in the intellectual
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-renegotiation-of-nafta-is-starting-to-look-a-lotlike-the-tpp/:
While the document states that ISDS would have to be more transparent (hearings and
judgments would be public) and “consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice,” it
still exists, meaning corporations could still functionally overturn sovereign laws outside
of the court system, and win billions of damages when governments try to write rules in
the public interest.
21. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the European Union
and Its Member States, Can.-EU, ch. 8, Oct. 30, 2016 [hereinafter CETA]; European Union–
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement,
EU-Viet., ch. 8 (Jan.
2016 Draft),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.
22. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 910:
Greater preparation and engagement in this area will help us improve ISDS while
enhancing our understanding of this highly controversial mechanism. For those who
want to keep ISDS outside the intellectual property field, a deepened understanding will
also strengthen our ability to resist the use of investment law in the intellectual property
field.
23. As I noted in a recent article:
[I]t will be important to start thinking more deeply about the investment-related aspects
of intellectual property rights. After all, policymakers, commentators, and civil society
organizations are unlikely to propose solutions to improve ISDS if they just focus on
how to keep ISDS outside the intellectual property field. By the time they realize that
the mechanism cannot be kept outside the field, it will just be too late to start studying
the investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
Id.
24. See sources cited infra notes 26 and 147.
25. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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property area will not undermine the ongoing effort to prevent ISDS from
being used in this area. In fact, it will help advocates develop stronger
arguments explaining why intellectual property carve-outs are badly
needed in ISDS.26 To date, those arguments have scored some important
victories. A case in point is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement Between Canada and the European Union27 (“CETA”).
Signed in October 2016, this agreement imposes limits on the use of ISDS
to “determin[e] . . . the existence and validity of intellectual property
rights.”28
This Article focuses on the growing use of ISDS in the intellectual
property area and explores what reforms can be undertaken to improve
the mechanism. Part I highlights the substantive problems posed by ISDS
in this area. It further examines the mechanism’s deleterious impact on
the multilateral intellectual property system built upon the TRIPS
Agreement. Part II calls for greater crossfertilization between ISDS and
the WTO system. Specifically, it advances a two-tier proposal calling for
institutional reforms concerning arbitral panels while advocating the
establishment of a new ISDS appellate body. This proposal draws on both
the EU Proposal and the existing WTO dispute settlement process. 29 Part
26. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 58 (2015) [hereinafter Baker & Geddes, Corporate Power
Unbound] (proposing “to rewrite the [TPP] Investment Chapter to explicitly exclude IPRs
[intellectual property rights] and to clarify that IPRs are not even indirectly protected by the
definition of ‘investment’”); Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Course Between TRIPS Flexibilities and
Investor-State Proceedings, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 458 (2016) [hereinafter Ho, A Collision
Course] (calling for “states to exclude IP [intellectual property] from ICSID [International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes] disputes under Article 25(4) of [the] ICSID [Convention]”);
Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property
Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 255 (2015) [hereinafter Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege]
(“Intellectual property should be excluded from investor-state arbitration because providing
enhanced protection of IP does not satisfy traditional justifications for investment arbitrations.”);
Sean Flynn, TPP Carve out for Tobacco Shows Core Flaws in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS), INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 1, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35107:
Tobacco should be carved out of free trade agreements. But so should all other claims of
“indirect” expropriation of expected profits of a company through health and safety
regulations, including the regulation of intellectual property. At minimum, the treating
of the IP chapter differently than all other substantive chapters (which remain subject
only to state to state adjudication) needs to be fixed.
27. CETA, supra note 21.
28. Id. Annex 8-D (Joint Declaration Concerning Article 8.12.6) (“Mindful that the Tribunal for
the resolution of investment disputes between investors and states is . . . not an appeal mechanism
for the decisions of domestic courts, the Parties recall that the domestic courts of each Party are
responsible for the determination of the existence and validity of intellectual property rights.”).
29. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding] (providing the rules for the WTO dispute

2017]

Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS

327

III assesses the strengths and limitations of this proposal and offers some
preliminary responses to its critics.
I. ONGOING CONCERNS
In a recent article, I outlined three distinct sets of problems relating to
the existing ISDS mechanism: process-related, interpretation-related, and
outcome-related.30 Collectively, these problems reveal its substantive and
procedural flaws. They also explain why this mechanism has attracted
trenchant critiques from policymakers, commentators, civil society
organizations, mass media, and members of the public.31 Given the
discussion in the earlier work, this Part does not intend to re-identify these
problems. Instead, it focuses on problems that will arise when ISDS is
being used in the intellectual property area. To underscore these more
specific problems, this Part regroups them based on three distinct sets of
ongoing concerns: inconsistency, incoherence, and inequity. This Part
discusses each set of concerns in turn.
A. Inconsistency
The first set of concerns relates to the high volume of inconsistencies
the ISDS mechanism has produced.32 These inconsistencies can be found
settlement process).
30. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 851–65.
31. See Clinton and Sanders Oppose “Lame Duck” Vote on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OR.
FAIR TRADE CAMPAIGN (May 6, 2016), http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/oregon/2016/05/05/
clinton-and-sanders-oppose-lame-duck-tpp-vote (reporting that Hillary Clinton described ISDS as
“flawed” and called for “a new paradigm for trade agreements that doesn’t give special rights to
corporations, but not to workers and NGOs”); Deirdre Fulton, As Countries Line up to Sign Toxic
Deal, Warren Leads Call to Reject TPP, COMMON DREAMS (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/02/03/countries-line-sign-toxic-deal-warren-leadscall-reject-tpp (reporting that Senator Elizabeth Warren condemned ISDS for giving large
multinational corporations “the right to challenge laws they don’t like—not in court, but in front of
industry-friendly arbitration panels that sit outside any court system”); see also Jessica Hopper &
Ines de la Cuetara, Donald Trump Slams Trans-Pacific Partnership as ‘A Continuing Rape of Our
Country,’ ABC NEWS (June 29, 2016, 7:17 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trumpslams-trans-pacific-partnership-continuing-rape/story?id=40213090
(reporting
that
thenpresidential candidate Donald Trump lambasted the TPP as “another disaster, done and pushed by
special interests who want to rape our country”).
32. See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473 (2009)
(“[U]npredictability and incoherence in investor-state dispute settlement . . . are considerable and
in need of serious attention. . . .”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1521, 1558–82 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy Crisis] (discussing inconsistent
decisions in investment treaty arbitrations); Stefanie Schacherer, TPP, CETA and TTIP Between
Innovation and Consolidation—Resolving Investor-State Disputes Under Mega-regionals, 7 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 628, 640 (2016) (“Inconsistency of arbitral awards is [a] frequent
criticism of investment arbitration.”); Stephan W. Schill, The European Commission’s Proposal of
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in “(1) cases involving the same facts, related parties, and similar
investment rights, (2) cases involving similar commercial situations and
similar investment rights, and (3) cases involving different parties,
different commercial situations, and the same investment rights.”33
Although inconsistent arbitral decisions affect all ISDS cases, not just
those in the intellectual property area, having a more consistent and
predictable arbitration system will be important regardless of what
subject matter the investor-state disputes cover.
In ISDS cases, the lack of consistency and predictability is generally
attributed to three reasons. The first reason is that ISDS lacks binding
precedents.34 As Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger reminded us:
an “Investment Court System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing
International
Investment
Law?,
ASIL
INSIGHTS
(Apr.
22,
2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-proposal-investmentcourt-system-ttip-stepping:
[T]he decentralized structure of arbitration has resulted in a significant number of
inconsistent and incoherent decisions as regards the interpretation of not only similar
provisions across different [international investment agreements], but also provisions of
the same agreement in relation to virtually identical facts. These inconsistencies have
fueled concern about the lack of predictability of international investment law, adding to
the sense of a legitimacy crisis of the field.
33. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 32, at 1559 (footnotes omitted).
34. The debate on the lack of binding precedents, however, is not that clear-cut. Compare
Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188, 1196 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter
OXFORD HANDBOOK]:
[I]n some cases tribunals did not follow earlier decisions but adopted different solutions.
At times, they simply adopted a different solution without distancing themselves from
the earlier decision. At other times, they referred to the earlier decision and pointed out
that they were unconvinced by what another tribunal had said and that, therefore, their
decision departed from the one adopted earlier.
with Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, Precedents in International Investment Law, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 1505, 1508 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds.,
2015) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK] (“Despite the absence of a
formal doctrine of binding precedent, investment tribunals generally rely on earlier awards to
buttress their legal reasoning, often treating them as determinative or authoritative statements of
applicable rules or principles of law.” (footnote omitted)), Loretta Malintoppi, Independence,
Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure of Arbitrators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra, at 789, 792
(“While it cannot be said that the rule of legal precedent (stare decisis) applies in international
arbitration in general, investment arbitration has witnessed a growth in reported jurisprudence.
Litigation parties frequently rely on this jurisprudence to support their legal arguments and tribunals
often apply these precedents as grounds for their findings.” (footnote omitted)), and Cheng TaiHeng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1016
(2007) (“[A]lthough arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent
in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful, system of precedent
that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize international
investment law.” (footnote omitted)). For discussions of the doctrine of precedent in relation to
international investment arbitration, see generally Bungenberg & Titi, supra; Joshua Karton,
Lessons from International Uniform Law, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 48 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-
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Reliance on past decisions is a fundamental feature of any orderly
decision process. Drawing on the experience of past decision plays an
important role in securing the necessary uniformity and stability of the
law. The need for a coherent case-law is evident. It strengthens the
predictability of decisions and enhances their authority.35

Although stare decisis remains a special feature of common law and is
unlikely to be available in other types of jurisdictions, disputing parties
from around the world increasingly expect similar cases to be decided
consistently and predictably.36 In the WTO, for example, even though the
dispute panels and the Appellate Body are not required to follow any
precedent, they have used previous cases for explanation and support.37
As the Appellate Body reasoned in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages,38 the use of earlier relevant cases could help “create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members.”39 Similarly, in a case
filed by Serbia and Montenegro against Portugal, judges of the
International Court of Justice declared, “[I]n exercising its choice, [the
Court] must ensure consistency with its own past case law in order to
provide predictability. Consistency is the essence of judicial reasoning.
This is especially true in different phases of the same case or with regard
Bret eds., 2015) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM]; Schreuer & Weiniger, supra; Andres
Rigo Sureda, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 830 (Christina Binder et
al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW].
35. Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 34, at 1189.
36. See August Reinisch, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 34, at 894, 905–08 (discussing the danger of inconsistent investment
arbitral awards).
37. As the WTO noted in its training materials:
Even if adopted, the reports of panels and the Appellate Body are not binding precedents
for other disputes between the same parties on other matters or different parties on the
same matter, even though the same questions of WTO law might arise. As in other areas
of international law, there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement according
to which previous rulings bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases. This
means that a panel is not obliged to follow previous Appellate Body reports even if they
have developed a certain interpretation of exactly the provisions which are now at issue
before the panel. Nor is the Appellate Body obliged to maintain the legal interpretations
it has developed in past cases. . . . If the reasoning developed in the previous report in
support of the interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the perspective of
the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is very likely that the panel or
the Appellate Body will repeat and follow it. This is also in line with a key objective of
the dispute settlement system which is to enhance the security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system. . . .
7.2 Legal Status of Adopted/Unadopted Reports in Other Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2017).
38. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Docs.
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996).
39. Id. at 13.
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to closely related cases.”40
The second reason is that ISDS lacks an appellate mechanism. As
Cynthia Ho lamented, “[a]lthough tribunals often rely on prior decisions
and awards, and counsel for parties regularly cite prior decisions, the lack
of hierarchy among tribunals as compared to traditional court systems, as
well as the lack of an appellate system, may result in unpredictability.”41
Likewise, Asif Qureshi observed, “[m]ost successful judicial systems are
accompanied by an appellate process.”42 Indeed, the call for introducing
an appellate mechanism to international investment arbitration can be
traced back to at least the 1980s.43 In regard to investment, Section 2102
of the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 also included among the principal trade
negotiating objectives the provision of “an appellate body or similar
mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment
provisions in trade agreements.”44 It is therefore no surprise that Article
9.23.11 of the TPP Agreement includes obligations that are conditioned
on the future development of “an appellate mechanism for reviewing
awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals.”45
To address the shortcoming in this area, commentators have advanced
several institutional reforms. For instance, Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy
Frankel have supported “the creation of a central appellate body for
investment disputes to address both consistency and substantive
issues, . . . [as such a body] would have the same appreciation for IP
[intellectual property] rationales as . . . the [WTO] Appellate Body would
have for public-regarding principles.”46 Focusing on the active
40. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Port.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 1160, 1208,
¶ 3 (Dec. 15) (joint declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans,
Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, and Elaraby).
41. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 234.
42. Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate System in International Investment Arbitration?, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 1154, 1155.
43. See Ieva Kalnina & Domenico Di Pietro, The Scope of ICSID Review: Remarks on Selected
Problematic Issues of ICSID Decisions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 34, at
221, 245 (“The idea of a permanent review institution that could ensure consistency of the
international arbitral jurisprudence has been contemplated in doctrine since the 1980s.”).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2012).
45. The provision states:
In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investorState dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the future under other institutional
arrangements, the Parties shall consider whether awards rendered under Article 9.29
(Awards) should be subject to that appellate mechanism. The Parties shall strive to
ensure that any such appellate mechanism they consider adopting provides for
transparency of proceedings similar to the transparency provisions established in Article
9.24 (Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings).
TPP Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.23.11.
46. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 601
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involvement of the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), many commentators have also explored
the possibility of creating an appeals facility within ICSID. 47
The last reason is that the existing ISDS mechanism does not provide
much transparency. As Kate Miles lamented, although ISDS cases
“resolve questions that can affect significant matters of public policy, the
public generally does not have access to the documents, the proceedings
are conducted behind closed doors, and the submission of amicus curiae
briefs is restricted, if permitted at all.”48 Even worse, policymakers,
commentators, and civil society organizations thus far have had great
difficulty uncovering what happens in ISDS proceedings.49 A case in
point is Philip Morris’ ISDS case against Australia, whose notice of claim
was made available only through a request for declassification under the
Australian Freedom of Information Act.50 Had the case not been publicly
disclosed, one has to wonder whether it would have received as much
public attention as it did.51
(2015); see also Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 32, at 1606–10 (discussing the benefits of
establishing an appellate mechanism in investment treaty arbitrations); Okediji, Is Intellectual
Property “Investment”?, supra note 18, at 1137 (calling for the provision of “a form of appellate
review for investor-state disputes involving intellectual property, such as the type that exists in the
WTO system or in national law”); Qureshi, supra note 42 (discussing the expediency and feasibility
of having an appellate system in international investment arbitration); Reinisch, supra note 36, at
910–11 (discussing the need for an appellate mechanism in investment arbitration). For a collection
of articles on the development of an appellate mechanism within ISDS, see generally RESHAPING
THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 403–505.
47. See ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration
(ICSID Secretariat, Discussion Paper, 2004), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/
Possible%20Improvements%20of%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf
(advancing the proposal for an ICSID appeals facility); Kalnina & Di Pietro, supra note 43, at 245–
46 (discussing the potential creation of an ICSID Appeals Body); Donald McRae, The WTO
Appellate Body: A Model for an ICSID Appeals Facility?, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 371 (2010)
(doubting that the success of the WTO Appellate Body could be emulated in an appeals facility for
the investment area); Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu & Collins C. Ajibo, ICSID Annulment Procedure
and the WTO Appellate System: The Case for an Appellate System for Investment Arbitration, 6 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 308, 326–30 (2015) (discussing whether ICSID should have an appellate
mechanism).
48. Kate Miles, Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the Public Interest
into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 295, 295–
96 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010).
49. See Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 234 (noting that “the proceedings and
decisions may lack the same level of transparency as most judicial decisions”); Schacherer, supra
note 32, at 647 (“The lack of transparency of the proceedings has been among the first criticisms
raised against investment arbitration.”).
50. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 853–54 (noting the request for
declassification).
51. See ANNA JOUBIN-BRET, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY CENTRE ON
INVESTMENT DISPUTES? 2 (2015) (“[A] host of cases brought under investment contracts or before
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or regional arbitration institutions are not publicly
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B. Incoherence
The second set of concerns pertains to the growing incoherence in the
international intellectual property system, which has been built upon not
only the TRIPS Agreement, but also other international intellectual
property agreements administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”).52 These concerns can be attributed to at least
four reasons.
The first reason is that the proliferation of ISDS cases and the arrival
of new investment discussions in the intellectual property area have
greatly fragmented the multilateral system.53 Indeed, the growing trend
of using investment law and fora to set international intellectual property
norms has led norm-setting activities to shift from the intellectual
property regime to the investment regime.54 Such a regime shift could
greatly reduce the historical context concerning international intellectual
known. . . .”); Gary B. Born & Ethan G. Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency in
Commercial and Investor-State International Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 5, 28 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009):
The UNCITRAL Rules . . . provide for ad hoc arbitration with no central registry or
requirement that the existence of UNCITRAL cases be publicly registered. For this
reason, investors seeking to keep their disputes with states out of the public eye may
decide, treaty permitting, to opt for an ad hoc arbitral mechanism rather than ICSID.
Some non-trivial percentage of investor-state arbitrations are thus never made public.
52. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 18 (2007) (noting the growing “focus on the coherence
of intellectual property policies, in addition to the maintenance of balance and flexibility in those
policies”).
53. See Peter K. Yu, The Non-multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property
Normsetting, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 83, 93–94 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter Yu, Non-multilateral Approach]
(discussing the growing fragmentation of the international regulatory system); see also Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2007) (noting that the
growing proliferation of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and
ambiguous boundaries has helped powerful states to preserve their dominance); Jagdish Bhagwati,
U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2–3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995)
(warning that the negotiation of a new wave of preferential trade agreements could lead to the
creation of a “spaghetti bowl”).
54. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 46, at 566 (“While TRIPS laid the platform for
commodification, much of the current regime shifting is reconceptualizing IP as an asset and
progressively detaching it from its grounding in incentive-based principles.”); James Gathii &
Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the WTO to the International
Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 427, 430 (2017) (footnote omitted):
[T]he preference for bringing investor-state arbitration is not merely a case of forum
shopping which would entail pursuing a one-time successful case—but regime shifting
designed to re-draw international and domestic laws and regulations that balance
intellectual property law protections with public purposes such as safeguarding the
regulatory autonomy of states in the areas of health, human rights, and development.
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property laws and policies while at the same time taking away the
technical expertise needed to deal with specific rules in this challenging
area.55
In addition, the allowance for the use of parallel proceedings56 to
challenge intellectual property and intellectual property-related
regulations in host states threatens to “make the multilateral system less
appealing and thereby undermine its stability and growth.” 57 For many
host states with limited resources, such as those in the developing world,
the greater focus on defending ISDS cases can also “[force these]
countries to divert scarce time, resources, energy, and attention from
other international intergovernmental initiatives,” including the
development of the multilateral intellectual property system. 58
The second reason is that ISDS awards can upset the TRIPS bargain.
In fact, those awards could slowly rewrite the TRIPS Agreement—or, for
that matter, other multilateral trade or intellectual property agreements.59
55. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 39–40 (2008)
(“[T]he WTO lacks the important historical context and technical considerations to evaluate the
need for an international instrument on [limitations and exceptions to copyright] and to analyze the
nature and scope of what might be contained in such an instrument.”); JAYASHREE WATAL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (2001)
(“WIPO . . . has a mandate to strengthen IPR protection and can thus start discussions on IP
subjects more easily than the WTO. It can also draw upon experts from both the government and
private sector for more broad-based discussions.”); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 367–75 (2004) [hereinafter
Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (noting the need for intellectual property norm setting to move
from the WTO back to WIPO for the negotiation of two new Internet-related treaties). For
discussions of “forum shifting” or “regime shifting” strategies, see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE
& PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564–71 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra, at 408–16.
56. See Daniel Kalderimis, Exploring the Differences Between WTO and Investment Treaty
Dispute Resolution, in TRADE AGREEMENTS AT THE CROSSROADS 46, 58 (Susy Frankel &
Meredith Kolsky Lewis eds., 2014) (discussing the various cases in which “the same dispute has
triggered both WTO and arbitration procedures”); Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1,
at 833 (providing an example of parallel proceedings relating to efforts to challenge the plainpackaging regulations for tobacco products in Australia); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel
Proceedings, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 1008 (discussing parallel proceedings in
investment arbitration).
57. Yu, Non-multilateral Approach, supra note 53, at 92.
58. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA.
L. REV. 1045, 1089 (2012).
59. See Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 223 (arguing that “permitting companies
to challenge domestic decisions regarding intellectual property through investor-state disputes is
problematic because they disrupt internationally agreed norms under TRIPS, and also because the
historical justifications for protecting foreign investors do not apply”); Okediji, Is Intellectual
Property “Investment”?, supra note 18, at 1123–24 (footnote omitted):
On face value, Eli Lilly’s claims could effectively constitute a revision of NAFTA. If
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Such rewriting will undermine the hard-earned bargains developing
countries have won through the WTO negotiations.60 A case in point is
the moratorium imposed on non-violation complaints—complaints of
nullification or impairment of trade benefits when no substantive
violation has occurred.61 Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement,
this moratorium has been repeatedly extended—most recently during the
Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in
December 2017.62 Despite this extension, nothing can prevent ISDS
arbitrators from considering complaints that are based on impaired
benefits or frustrated expectations, as opposed to substantive violations.
Similarly, Brook Baker and Katrina Geddes expressed concern that
“there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a
governmental failure to intercept alleged infringing products in-transit via
stringent border measures.”63 In their view, such a failure “might be
interpreted to violate the right to fair and equitable treatment in
administrative border procedures.”64 Their concern is highly
understandable considering the controversy generated by repeated intransit seizures of pharmaceutical products65 during the negotiations for
Lilly is successful in its grander objective—a ruling that Canada is required to change
its current utility standard—the implications for intellectual property multilateralism,
and for intellectual property policy in all countries, would be stunning indeed.
60. See Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual
Property Law, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 121, 124 (2016) [hereinafter Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap]
(“The current investment disputes where investors claim indirect expropriation or the absence of
fair and equitable treatment of IP are not just IP in a new forum, but point toward a shift away from
the balancing mechanisms that are integral to IP (even if those mechanisms do not always operate
as well as they might) to a sphere which has fewer (if any) equivalent balancing mechanisms.”
(footnotes omitted)); Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 250 (“Beyond interfering with
an existing dispute resolution process and producing potentially inconsistent decisions, permitting
investor-state arbitrations to overrule internationally agreed upon domestic flexibilities under
TRIPS seems particularly unfair to countries since TRIPS already encroaches on traditional
domestic authority in the area of intellectual property rights.”); see also Ruth L. Okediji, Back to
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L.
& TECH. J. 125, 129 (2004) (lamenting that bilateral free trade agreements threaten to “roll back
both substantive and strategic gains” won by developing countries in the multilateral process).
61. See generally Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of
Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023 (2009) (discussing non-violation complaints in
the TRIPS context).
62. See World Trade Organization, TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints: Draft
Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/W/7 (providing the draft
ministerial decision indicating the WTO members’ agreement to refrain from initiating any nonviolation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement until the next WTO Ministerial Meeting in
December 2019).
63. Baker & Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound, supra note 26, at 34 (footnote omitted).
64. Id.
65. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1009
(2011) (“[I]n the middle of the negotiations, the discussion of the seizure of in-transit generic drugs
became a very hot issue due to new developments in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
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the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement66 (“ACTA”). At that time, the
seizures were so contentious that India and Brazil filed complaints against
the European Union and the Netherlands before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body.67 Although India and the European Union eventually
reached an interim settlement in July 2011 amid their negotiations for a
new economic partnership agreement,68 neither Brazil nor India has
withdrawn its complaint.
The third reason is that ISDS could ratchet up the standards of
intellectual property protection and enforcement, thereby amplifying the
widely documented deleterious impacts of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral agreements.69 As I noted in an earlier article:
[T]he ISDS mechanism will enable intellectual property rights holders
to push for protection not yet covered by the TRIPS Agreement. Thus
far, many host states have been actively avoiding additional intellectual
property obligations under TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements. Yet the broad definition of covered
investment may allow intellectual property rights holders to use ISDS
to demand higher standards of intellectual property protection and
enforcement even when those standards are not required. If ISDS-based
strategies prove successful, developed country governments and
multinational corporations may become more eager to rewrite
Kingdom.”); Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1563, 1588 (2013) (“During the ACTA negotiations, stories about the seizure of pharmaceuticals
in Europe have raised important questions about the intellectual property enforcement standards set
in the TRIPS Agreement and the handling of in-transit goods under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.”). For discussions of the seizure of in-transit drugs, see generally CYNTHIA M.
HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON
PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 285–323 (2011); Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic
Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International
Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43, 44 (2009); Bryan Mercurio, ‘Seizing’
Pharmaceuticals in Transit: Analysing the WTO Dispute That Wasn’t, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389
(2012).
66. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243.
67. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of
Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consultations by
India, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010).
68. See Times News Network, India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES INDIA
(July 29, 2011, 1:21 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-EUink-deal-to-end-drug-seizure-for-now/articleshow/9401916.cms (reporting the interim settlement).
69. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade
agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting
Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement:
Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 (criticizing the AustraliaUnited States Free Trade Agreement); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 55, at 392–400
(discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual
property standards).
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international intellectual property rules outside the usual multilateral
fora, such as the WTO and WIPO.70

Even worse, ISDS could take away the many limitations, flexibilities,
and safeguards that have been carefully built into the TRIPS Agreement
and the larger international intellectual property system. 71 The
proliferation of ISDS cases could even create what commentators,
intergovernmental bodies, and civil society organizations have widely
referred to as “regulatory chill”72—a chilling effect that undermines a
country’s sovereign ability to regulate harmful conduct, including
conduct committed by transnational corporations.73 In fact, those host
states that find it costly to go through the ISDS process may be too eager
to change their laws to avoid costly arbitrations.74
70. Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 875; see also Carlos M. Correa, Investment
Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting of Compulsory
Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331, 352 (2004):
Intellectual property rights, registered or not, are protected investments under BITs
[bilateral investment treaties] and trade agreements that incorporate rules on investment.
This adds another layer of treaty-based protection onto rights protected under the TRIPS
Agreement and other international conventions. But this protection goes beyond TRIPS,
because investment agreements apply to rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement and
incorporate the national treatment principle clause without the exceptions provided for
under IPR treaties.
71. See Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap, supra note 60, at 124 (“The current investment
disputes where investors claim indirect expropriation or the absence of fair and equitable treatment
of IP are not just IP in a new forum, but point toward a shift away from the balancing mechanisms
that are integral to IP (even if those mechanisms do not always operate as well as they might) to a
sphere which has fewer (if any) equivalent balancing mechanisms.” (footnotes omitted)); Ho, A
Collision Course, supra note 26, at 453–57 (discussing ISDS’s potential chilling effects to
maintaining TRIPS flexibilities); Kathleen Liddell & Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable
Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 145, 146 (2016) (“[The recent] IP
cases in investment arbitration serve as an important wake-up call that investment tribunals could
constrain national IP flexibilities.”).
72. See, e.g., LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 67–68 (2016) (providing examples of “regulatory
chill”); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 128 (2015) (considering “regulatory chill” to be a concern of ISDS);
Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles
eds., 2011) [hereinafter EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY] (using political science to analyze
the “regulatory chill” hypothesis).
73. See Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 233 (“A major issue is that the suits
appear to improperly encroach on domestic authority and even have a chilling effect on legitimate
state regulatory functions due to substantial awards, as well as legal costs of defending such
cases.”).
74. See TPP’s ISDS: Moving from State-to-State to Company-to-World Dispute Resolution,
LEGAL READER (May 1, 2015), http://www.legalreader.com/tpps-isds-moving-from-state-to-stateto-company-to-world-dispute-resolution (surmising that New Zealand “decided against changing
their smoking laws out of fear of . . . retribution through ISDS”); see also MOUYAL, supra note 72,
at 68:
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To be sure, regulatory chill is difficult to prove because it requires
proving a negative.75 Nevertheless, such chill should not be overlooked,
especially in the intellectual property area.76 In this area, autonomy and
policy space are badly needed for countries to tailor laws and policies to
local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities.77 As Ruth Okediji
lamented:
Intellectual property obligations in the investment context . . . pose a
new threat to states’ traditional lawmaking powers by providing foreign
actors [with] a singular opportunity to challenge laws that have been
enacted with the domestic public interest in full view, even when they
are in conformity with international intellectual property treaties.
Subverting a core judicial function—interpretation of a domestic law
already infused with multilateral obligations—to the oversight of a
private international tribunal precariously alters the contours of state
power and responsibility for compliant domestic legislation and policy
prescriptions.78

The final reason is that ISDS arbitrators are generally unfamiliar with
intellectual property issues and may therefore take on an oversimplified
view of intellectual property.79 For example, they may focus primarily on
In response to [the foreign mining industry’s threat based on the Indonesia-United
Kingdom BIT or the Australia-Indonesia BIT], Indonesia retreated from the ban [on
open-cast mining in protected forest areas], first by exempting several of the companies
from the ban and promising to assess the situation of other affected companies.
Subsequently the government decided to repeal the ban.
75. As Jonathan Bonnitcha explained:
Chilling effects are difficult to identify because they require counterfactual evidence
about the regulations that would have existed in the absence of the purported chilling.
Regulatory chill due to [international investment treaty] protection is particularly
difficult to isolate because, in addition to identifying a chilling effect, one must be able
to exclude the possibility that it was attributable to some other cause.
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of
Investment Treaty Protections, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 72, at 117, 134
(footnote omitted).
76. See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 18, at 1133 (“The
conception of intellectual property as a tool to advance national welfare has long been part of
multilateral intellectual property relations. The basis for determining the ‘legitimate expectations’
of an intellectual property ‘investment’ thus must resonate in domestic law.” (footnote omitted)).
For examples of potential regulatory chill in the intellectual property area, see Brook K. Baker &
Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly v. Canada, Success, Judicial Reversal,
and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 505 (2017).
77. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Under BITs, FTAs
and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY,
supra note 72, at 485 (discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral and
regional trade and investment agreements on the state’s enjoyment of its policy space); see also
Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 833–55 (2007) (discussing
why policymakers need wide policy space to devise solutions to address internal problems).
78. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 18, at 1122.
79. As I noted in an earlier article, the experts’ unfamiliarity with another discipline goes in
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the protection levels without adequately considering the corresponding
limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards. They may also have tunnel
vision, thereby overemphasizing intellectual property rights as investors’
rights.80 As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy Frankel described:
Because investor rights and IP rights are both private rights, IP holders
tend to equate the investment protectable under these instruments to the
private economic value of their IP rights. Further, they see IP rights as
reliance interests that are defined by the law at the time they made their
investment or, more extremely, when the agreement references TRIPS
or its own IP chapter, the law at the time when the investment agreement
was made.81

In addition, there is growing concern that ISDS arbitrators will focus
narrowly on the intellectual property side of the investment bargain, thus
ignoring the concessions the host state has made outside the intellectual
property field, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export
custom duties, and preferential treatment on foreign exchange.82
C. Inequity
The last set of concerns regards inequity, especially the inequity

both directions:
Just as investment issues are new to those in the intellectual property field, intellectual
property issues are also new to those in the investment field. For example, investment
law experts may not be fully knowledgeable about the many complexities and nuances
within intellectual property law and policy. Likewise, intellectual property law experts
may be unfamiliar with the tradition and unique language of investment law, such as
“direct and indirect expropriation of property,” “minimum standard of treatment,” “fair
and equitable treatment,” and “full protection and security.”
Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 876; see also Liddell & Waibel, supra note 71, at
147 (noting the “doubts about whether investment arbitrators have the relevant expertise to
appreciate complex issues of IP law”).
80. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 872–73 (discussing the concern about
the ISDS arbitrators’ tunnel vision).
81. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 46, at 589.
82. As Peter Muchlinski observed:
Incentives are used by governments to attract investment, to steer investment into
favoured industries or regions, or to influence the character of an investment, for
example, when technology-intensive investment is being sought. They can take two
major forms, fiscal incentives, based on tax advantages to investors, and financial
incentives based on the provision of funds directly to investors to finance new
investments, or certain operations, or to defray capital or operational costs. Other types
of incentives may not be easy to discern but they can have a positive effect on the overall
profitability of an investment. These may include general infrastructure development by
the host country, market preferences or preferential treatment on foreign exchange.
Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 3, 33 (footnote omitted);
see also Anastasia Telesetsky, A New Investment Deal in Asia and Africa: Land Leases to Foreign
Investors, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 72, at 539 (discussing the various
concessions that states in Asia and Africa have made to attract foreign direct investment).

2017]

Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS

339

suffered by host states in the developing world. Thus far, the existing
ISDS mechanism has been heavily criticized for having partial and
unaccountable arbitrators.83 For instance, the arbitrators involved may
have worked in law firms that have clients in the same industry as those
filing ISDS complaints.84 They may also have a tendency to serve
corporate clients who are similar to the complainants.85 As Joost
Pauwelyn summarized:
ICSID arbitrators . . . get referred to as “elite lawyers,” “ambitious
investment lawyers keen to make a lucrative living,” a “mafia,” “super
arbitrators” who are “not just the mafia but a smaller, inner mafia,”
adjudicators—not faceless—but with conflicts of interest and a “hidden
agenda” (“one minute acting as counsel, the next framing the issue as
an academic, or influencing policy as a government representative or
expert witness”).86

When ISDS is used against host states in the developing world,
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations have also
noted their concern for the mechanism’s “development bias,”87 which
enables the process to favor the interests of transnational corporations at

83. See Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 234 (“Some . . . contend that arbitrators
lack the independence and impartiality of typical domestic or international tribunals.”); Joost
Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators Are from
Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 783 (2015) [hereinafter Pauwelyn,
The Rule of Law]:
Why is it that, on average, WTO panelists tend to be relatively low-key diplomats from
developing countries (very few U.S./EU nationals), with a government background, and
often without a law degree or legal expertise, whereas ICSID arbitrators are likely highpowered, elite private lawyers or legal academics from western Europe or the United
States? Why is the pool of ICSID arbitrators an ideologically divided, closed network
with a small number of individuals attracting most nominations, whereas the universe of
WTO panelists is ideologically more homogeneous, with a relatively low reappointment
rate and nominations more evenly distributed (with the consequence that panelists, on
average, have relatively little experience)?
84. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements
Without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 579, 604 (2015) (“The
comparatively small number of commercial arbitrators dominating ISDS procedures is often
interpreted as a sign of ‘capture’ of ICSID and UNCITRAL investor-state arbitration by a limited
number of law firms.”); David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 44 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working Papers on International Investment No. 2012/03, 2012) (“It
appears that over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have acted as counsel for investors in other ISDS cases
while it has been estimated about 10% of ISDS arbitrators have acted as counsel for States in other
cases.”).
85. See Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law, supra note 83, at 764 (noting “the closed network of
specialist ISDS arbitrators and lawyers” in “the terrain of subject-matter specialists”).
86. Id. at 780 (footnotes omitted).
87. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 435, 451 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes].
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the expense of host states in the developing world.88 As President Evo
Morales of Bolivia declared, “Governments in Latin America and I think
all over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always win.”89
These sentiments are unsurprising considering that the majority of the
complaints in ISDS cases were filed by investors from developed
countries.90
To address the development bias of the ISDS mechanism, developing
country governments and their supporters have called for the creation of
an appellate process. As Susan Franck observed:
If outcome is linked to the development status of the presiding arbitrator
and there is disparate pressure to favor the developed world, having
standing judges with secure tenures may enhance integrity and
independence. In order to eliminate pressure to join a club or secure
repeat appointments, a standing body could provide judicial oversight
and create an environment that favors rule of law adjudication.
Moreover, such an institution could foster the judicialization of
international economic law and provide a backstop to create certainty
about contested legal issues, thereby increasing the integrity of the
dispute resolution system.91

In sum, the arrival of ISDS in the intellectual property area has brought
with it many substantive and procedural problems that are inherent in the
88. As Susan Franck observed:
In investment arbitration, there is a lurking concern that the development status of
arbitrators, particularly presiding arbitrators who wield especially strong influence, may
be inappropriately associated with certain outcomes. One author even explains that there
is “some concern in developing countries over the selection of arbitrators” at entities
such as ICSID, and such appointments may create a “‘systemic . . . bias in favor of
Western legal concepts and the positions.’”
Id. at 450 (quoting AMAZU A. ASOUZU, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
AFRICAN STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 404–05
(2001)) (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted); see also id. at 451 (second ellipsis in original):
In a 2005 speech, Roberto Dañino, then Secretary-General of ICSID, . . . explained that
there is a concern “expressed by a few . . . that ICSID arbitrators are predominantly
nationals from developed countries, the implication being that they may be more
favorably inclined towards investors” from the developed world and less favorably
inclined towards governments from the developing world.
89. Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Toward OAS, Says Latin America Better Off
Without World Bank, ASSOCIATED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 30, 2007, 3:09 PM).
90. As stated in the 2016 World Investment Report:
Developed-country investors brought most of the 70 known cases in 2015. This follows
the historical trend in which developed-country investors have been the main ISDS users,
accounting for over 80 per cent of all known claims. The most frequent home States in
ISDS in 2015 were the United Kingdom, followed by Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. . . .
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES
105 (2016).
91. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 87, at 484.
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ISDS mechanism. This Part groups these problems based on three distinct
sets of concerns: inconsistency, incoherence, and inequity. If the use of
ISDS is to be encouraged in the intellectual property area, policymakers
and commentators will have to find ways to provide considerable
improvements to the existing ISDS mechanism.
II. A MODEST TWO-TIER PROPOSAL
To alleviate the concerns about inconsistency, incoherence, and
inequity identified in Part I, commentators have advanced a large number
of institutional reforms, including the establishment of international
investment courts92 and the development of an appellate mechanism.93
The need for institutional reforms has attracted even more analysis and
debate in the wake of the EU Proposal,94 which called for the creation of
a two-tier investment court system that includes a Tribunal of First
Instance and an Appeal Tribunal.95 Unlike the existing ISDS mechanism,
all the judges in this proposed court system will be appointed through a
joint committee by the European Union and the United States, not the
disputing parties.96
Following the release of the EU Proposal, policymakers and
commentators have quickly offered their evaluations.97 A close variant

92. See Omar E. García-Bolívar, Permanent Investment Tribunals: The Momentum Is Building
Up, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 394 (discussing the ongoing push to
establish permanent investment tribunals); Eduardo Zuleta, The Challenges of Creating a Standing
International Investment Court, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 403
(identifying the challenges for creating a standing international investment court as an alternative
to the existing ISDS system); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 32, at 1617–25 (calling for the
establishment of an “Investment Arbitration Appellate Court”); Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege,
supra note 26, at 235 (“[S]ome suggest replacing private arbiters with an international investment
court to promote impartiality and independence.”); Schill, supra note 32 (suggesting the option “to
create permanent investment courts in important mega-regionals, such as TTIP, structured so as to
morph easily into a multilateral institution with third states simply joining the tribunal’s statute”).
93. For articles calling for the development of an appellate mechanism within ISDS, see sources
cited supra note 47.
94. TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7.
95. See id. § 3, arts. 9–10 (advancing the proposal).
96. See id. § 3, art. 9(2) (“The [Services and Investment] Committee shall, upon the entry into
force of this Agreement, appoint fifteen Judges to the Tribunal. Five of the Judges shall be nationals
of a Member State of the European Union, five shall be nationals of the United States and five shall
be nationals of third countries.”); id. § 3, art. 10(3):
The [Services and Investment] Committee, shall, upon the entry into force of this
Agreement, appoint the members of the Appeal Tribunal. For this purpose, each Party
shall propose three candidates, two of which may be nationals of that Party and one shall
be a non-national, for the . . . Committee to thereafter jointly appoint the Members.
97. For these analyses, see generally Schacherer, supra note 32; Schill, supra note 32; Daniel J.
Gervais, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons from Lilly v.
Canada, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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of this proposal has also been incorporated into the investment chapter of
the recently adopted CETA.98 While I do not plan to rehash these earlier
analyses, I appreciate the EU Proposal’s many benefits and have
modified it to crossfertilize ISDS and the WTO system. In developing
this new proposal, especially regarding the part about arbitral panels, I
have also relied on the existing WTO dispute settlement process.99 If this
proposal is to strengthen the connections between these two rather
different systems, it will have to draw on the strengths of both systems.
A. Arbitral Panels
As shown in the arbitrations involving Eli Lilly and Philip Morris,
arbitral panels in investor-state disputes typically involve three
panelists.100 While the investor and host state each select one arbitrator,
the two selected arbitrators determine the third arbitrator, often with the
help of a neutral appointing authority,101 such as the Secretary-General
of ICSID or the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Thus far, this widely used format has seen great success. Nevertheless,
when it is used outside the traditional investment area, policymakers and
commentators have lamented the arbitrators’ lack of expertise in WTO
issues, including those relating to the specific WTO obligations involved
in the dispute.
In view of this shortcoming, my proposal calls for a modified version
of the existing ISDS mechanism, in which the arbitral panel handling a
dispute involving WTO obligations will have to include at least one
arbitrator who has demonstrated knowledge and experience in issues
concerning the specific obligations involved. For example, in a dispute
involving either Eli Lilly or Philip Morris, the panel will have to include
at least one arbitrator who has specialized expertise regarding TRIPS
98. See CETA, supra note 21, arts. 8.27–.29 (providing for the Tribunal and Appellate
Tribunal).
99. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29 (providing the rules for the WTO
dispute settlement process).
100. See Eli Lilly Final Award, supra note 17, ¶¶ 12–16 (identifying the three panelists); Philip
Morris v. Australia Award, supra note 15, ¶¶ 13, 16, 17 (identifying the three panelists); Philip
Morris v. Uruguay Award, supra note 16, ¶ 18 (identifying the three panelists).
101. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank, Arbitration
(Additional Facility) Rules, art. 6(1) (2006) (“In the absence of agreement between the parties
regarding the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist
of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the President
of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties, all in accordance with Article 9 of these
Rules.”); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, art. 9(1) (2010)
(amended in 2013) (“If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.
The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding
arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal.”).
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obligations. By contrast, in a dispute involving only traditional
investment issues, no arbitrator with WTO expertise will be required
because the dispute will not implicate any specific WTO obligations.
To determine whether this WTO expertise requirement has been met,
the proposal calls for the development of a list of arbitrators who are
familiar with each WTO area. This list will be similar to the “indicative
list of governmental and non-governmental individuals” specified in the
WTO rules,102 the Roster for NAFTA Dispute Settlement Panels and
Committees,103 or the list of judges in the investment court system under
the EU Proposal.104 Having a list of qualified arbitrators in a specific
WTO area will ensure that the arbitral panels will have the right expertise
to make high-quality decisions. It will also accelerate the panel-selection
process, thereby reducing the overall arbitral costs involved.
For illustrative purposes, consider an ISDS case involving a TRIPS
claim. In this case, the investor can easily pick an arbitrator from the list
of those having demonstrated knowledge and experience concerning the
TRIPS Agreement. If the investor chooses not to do so, the host state will
be able to make such a selection instead. If the host state also chooses not
to select somebody from that list, the two parties or the neutral appointing
authority must do so when selecting the final and presiding arbitrator.
If one party has already selected somebody from that list, nothing will
prevent the other party from choosing another person from the same list
or the final arbitrator from that list. The goal of this proposal is to ensure
that the arbitral panel will have an informed and high-quality discussion
of TRIPS obligations. If the panel ends up with two or more arbitrators
with specialized expertise concerning these obligations, there will be
even more beneficial crossfertilization between ISDS and the WTO
system.
Under my current proposal, the total number of arbitrators is three,
similar to the arrangements in the WTO, the TPP, and the EU Proposal.105
102. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29, art. 8.4 (“To assist in the selection
of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of governmental and non-governmental
individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in [article 8.1 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding], from which panelists may be drawn as appropriate.”).
103. Roster for NAFTA Dispute Settlement Panels and Committees, NAFTA SECRETARIAT,
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Roster-Members (last visited July 24,
2017).
104. See TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 9(2) (outlining the
process for appointing judges of the Tribunal of First Instance); id. § 3, art. 10(2)–(3) (outlining the
process for appointing judges of the Appeal Tribunal).
105. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29, art. 8.5 (“Panels shall be composed
of three panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days from the establishment of
the panel, to a panel composed of five panelists.”); TPP Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.22(1)
(“Unless the disputing parties agree otherwise, the tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators, one
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Although this proposal requires the existence of a neutral appointing
authority to oversee compliance with the WTO expertise requirement, it
leaves considerable flexibility regarding the selection of this authority.
Such selection will likely require serious deliberation within the
international community.
While this aspect of the proposal remains tentative, its international
coverage will require it to differ considerably from the EU Proposal.
Under the latter proposal, judges in the investment court system are to be
appointed by the European Union and the United States. By contrast, the
current proposal will require arbitral panels to feature international
representation.106 Their appointment can be made by “a multilateral body
representing the entire international community, such as the UN General
Assembly and the UN Security Council (as with the International Court
of Justice),” similar to what Stephan Schill proposed in his effort to
multilateralize the EU Proposal.107
B. Appellate Mechanism
With respect to the appellate mechanism, this proposal will closely
follow the EU Proposal. Under that proposal, the Appeal Tribunal will
include two judges selected from the European Union, two from the
United States, and two from third states.108 While the EU Proposal is
straightforward due to its bilateral nature, a proposal that is designed for
ISDS cases across the world will require a much more complicated
arbitrator appointed by each of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the presiding
arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.”); TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER
PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 9(6) (stating that “[t]he Tribunal shall hear cases in divisions
consisting of three Judges”).
106. This appointment process should strive to achieve equal and meaningful representation
from both developed and developing countries, similar to the proposal outlined for the development
of an ISDS appellate body in Part II.B. See infra text accompanying notes 110–112 (outlining the
proposal involving developed and developing countries as well as one involving high-income,
middle-income, and low-income countries).
107. Schill, supra note 32; see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 4(1), June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (“The members of the Court shall be elected by the
General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national
groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration . . . .”); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 32, at
1623:
[T]o retain its perceptions of legitimate authority, appellate judges should come from a
variety of backgrounds, and the mix would fairly need to represent both developed and
developing countries. The standards for appointment should also enumerate the
qualifications of judges to ensure a mix of expertise in areas such as arbitration,
economics, investment law, and public international law.
108. See TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 10(2) (“The Appeal
Tribunal shall be composed of six Members, of whom two shall be nationals of a Member State of
the European Union, two shall be nationals of the United States and two shall be nationals of third
countries.”).
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selection process.109
Although one could widely debate which selection process will result
in the best mix of experts in the proposed ISDS appellate body, an easy
choice is to select two members from developed countries and two from
developing countries, as opposed to two each from the European Union
and the United States. With respect to the two other members who are
supposed to come from third states, this proposal will call for those two
members to be selected from the WTO system—for instance, former
WTO panelists, former members of the WTO Appellate Body, 110 or even
experts who are qualified to serve on WTO panels.111 In doing so, this
proposal will equip the proposed ISDS appellate body with arbitrators
who are familiar with the WTO and its obligations. The WTO expertise
requirement for this body is similar to the arrangement for arbitral panels,
except that the panels will require knowledge and experience regarding
the specific WTO obligations involved in the dispute, as opposed to
general familiarity with the WTO and its obligations.
If one takes the same view as I do—that the arrival of powerful middleincome countries such as Brazil, China, and India has greatly distorted
the international economic system112 to the point that the separation of
developed and developing countries no longer provides satisfactory
representation—the proposed ISDS appellate body could easily be
expanded to have eight seats. Those eight seats would include two
members each from three groups of countries: high-income, middleincome, and low-income. The remaining two seats would be reserved for
those with WTO expertise, as discussed earlier.
Under the current proposal, the total membership of the ISDS appellate
body will be either six or eight, depending on whether the body is

109. See Schill, supra note 32.
110. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 901 (calling for “the inclusion of
some previous WTO panelists or Appellate Body members in [a proposed] appellate mechanism”);
see also Theodore R. Posner & Marguerite C. Walter, The Abiding Role of State-State Engagement
in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at
381, 389–91 (discussing the use of state-to-state dispute settlement to support ISDS).
111. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29, art. 8.1:
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served
as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor
agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy,
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
112. See Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84 (Randall Peerenboom
& Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) (discussing the complications created by emerging intellectual
property powers).
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structured under the original or modified version of the proposal. That
total number, however, can be easily expanded by multiples of three or
four. This proposal chooses six or eight members based on the EU
Proposal and the fact that a higher number tends to make decisions more
difficult. Nevertheless, the arrangements can be modified with the right
justification. Indeed, Article 10(4) of the EU Proposal states specifically
that “the number of the Members of the Appeal Tribunal [may be
increased] by multiples of three.”113
To be sure, having WTO expertise is not the same as having TRIPS
expertise.114 Indeed, the WTO has about thirty agreements, whose
coverage ranges from goods to services and from agriculture to
textiles.115 Nevertheless, it is impossible to include experts in all the
subject matters covered by the WTO in the proposed ISDS appellate
body. Nor is it easy to find many individual experts with a broad range of
WTO expertise who can serve as appellate body members. The goal of
this proposal is to ensure that somebody in the proposed appellate body
will have demonstrated knowledge and experience in WTO issues so as
to promote coherence between ISDS and the WTO system. This proposal,
however, recognizes the inability to equip the proposed ISDS appellate
body with expertise in every single area covered by the WTO.
Moreover, the arbitral panel below already includes at least one
arbitrator with demonstrated knowledge and expertise concerning the
specific WTO obligations, such as TRIPS obligations in an intellectual
property case. That panel will therefore be in a good position to provide
a record of the various WTO-related issues, concerns, and challenges
involved even if it ends up with a decision somewhat inconsistent with
the prevailing interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement. Drawing on this
record, the proposed ISDS appellate body should be able to make an
informed decision. Members who are already familiar with the WTO and
its obligations should be able to draw on their own experience and use
analogical reasoning116 to examine the TRIPS-related issues identified by
the arbitral panel as if those issues concerned their own field of expertise.
They will also be in a good position to share their WTO experience with
fellow members who do not have similar expertise.
113. TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 10(4).
114. Thanks to Gus Van Harten for pushing me on this point.
115. The
WTO
Agreements,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm (last visited July 26,
2017).
116. For discussions of analogical reasoning, see generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109
HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50
EMORY L.J. 1197 (2001); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1179 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
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Finally, beyond the two members who have been selected for their
WTO expertise, additional WTO expertise may be found in those
members of the proposed ISDS appellate body that have been selected by
developed and developing countries—or, in the modified proposal, by
high-income, middle-income, and low-income countries. If that is the
case, the WTO expertise in the proposed appellate body will greatly
increase. Thus, this proposal strongly encourages the selection of
members with a diverse and complementary range of WTO expertise. In
doing so, the proposed ISDS appellate body will be well-equipped to
handle ISDS cases covering many different WTO areas.
III. ASSESSMENT
To assess the strengths and limitations of this proposal, this Part
explores how the proposal can help address the various concerns and
problems identified earlier in the Article. It further discusses potential
criticisms and offers some preliminary responses to the proposal’s critics.
A. Strengths
In relation to the problems identified in Part I, the current proposal
features four sets of strengths. The first strength targets inconsistent
interpretations. While this proposal does not introduce a precedential
system and arbitral panels can still reach contradictory decisions as a
result, the proposed ISDS appellate body will help ensure greater
consistency and predictability. To a large extent, the process is
reminiscent of the WTO system. Even though that system is not
precedential by nature, WTO panelists and members of the Appellate
Body have taken great effort to follow past decisions to promote
consistency and predictability117 and to “create legitimate expectations
among WTO Members.”118
The second strength addresses the incoherence in the international
intellectual property system. By crossfertilizing ISDS with the WTO
system, this proposal helps reduce fragmentation in the international
intellectual property arena—in particular, the fragmentation brought
about by the increased use of ISDS in this arena.119 Specifically, the
117. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 37–39.
118. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 14, WTO Docs.
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996).
119. See SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 158 (2d ed. 2012) (“Foreign investment law is . . . influenced by cross-fertilisation from
other areas of public international law, especially those relating to human rights and environmental
protection, as well as certain fundamental principles of international economic law such as the
principle of economic self-determination of states, the right to develop, and the permanent
sovereignty of states over their natural resources.”); Ho, A Collision Course, supra note 26, at 464
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proposal will ensure that the arbitral panels and the proposed ISDS
appellate body will include personnel with demonstrated knowledge and
experience in WTO issues, and likely also expertise in public
international law.120 As Andreas Ziegler observed:
It may be useful to encourage arbitrators and the members of judicial
bodies of multilateral organizations like the WTO and ICSID to refer to
each other’s case law and engage in a judicial debate. This could avoid
the scenario where each system operates in clinical isolation and would
certainly be beneficial for the development of an inter-institutional
debate on special issues affecting global trade and investment flows.121

To be sure, the proposal does not ensure that all decisionmakers will be
familiar with the WTO and its obligations. Nevertheless, it is still
important to have at least one decisionmaker with such knowledge who
can help explain to others the potential WTO-related issues, concerns,
and challenges involved.
At the panel stage, this proposal will also ensure that all arbitral panels
will include at least one arbitrator who has demonstrated knowledge and
(“[I]increased awareness and cross-fertilization in the investment arena of TRIPS norms would be
desirable.”).
120. Cf. CETA, supra note 21, art. 8.27.4 (“The Members of the Tribunal . . . shall have
demonstrated expertise in public international law. It is desirable that they have expertise in
particular, in international investment law, in international trade law and the resolution of disputes
arising under international investment or international trade agreements.”); id. art. 8.28.4 (“The
Members of the Appellate Tribunal shall meet the requirements of Article 8.27.4. . . .”); TTIP
INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 9(4) (“The Judges . . . shall have
demonstrated expertise in public international law. It is desirable that they have expertise in
particular, in international investment law, international trade law and the resolution of disputes
arising under international investment or international trade agreements.”); id. § 3, art. 10(7) (“The
Members of the Appeal Tribunal . . . shall have demonstrated expertise in public international law.
It is desirable that they have expertise in international investment law, international trade law and
the resolution of disputes arising under international investment or international trade
agreements.”).
121. Andreas R. Ziegler, Investment Law in Conflict with WTO Law?, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 1784, 1800; see also Appellate Body Report,
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 17, WTO Doc.
WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996) (declaring that “the General Agreement [on Tariffs and
Trade] is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law”); UNCTAD-ICTSD
PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT 130 (2005) (noting that, in United States—Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body “moved firmly away from the notion of the WTO as a
‘self-contained’ legal regime”); Miles, supra note 48, at 296:
There is . . . a need for greater engagement with principles from other areas of
international law. Although international investment agreements do not exist in a
vacuum, the logical consequences of this appreciation are not often embraced in arbitral
awards or investment treaty negotiation. If they were, we would already have seen the
development of more socially and environmentally responsible norms of international
investment law—and more emphasis on protecting the host state’s right to regulate in
the public interest.
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experience in issues concerning the specific WTO obligations implicated
in the dispute—for example, TRIPS obligations in the ISDS disputes
involving Eli Lilly and Philip Morris. While nothing prevents the arbitral
panel from going beyond the consideration of TRIPS obligations, the
proposal aims to ensure that the panelists will be able to make an
informed decision regarding those obligations. In doing so, it seeks to
reduce the tensions and conflicts between ISDS and the TRIPS-based
international intellectual property system. It also hopes that a more
informed deliberation will eventually convince the arbitral panel to honor
the decades-old TRIPS bargain.
The third strength relates to equity. By including in the proposed ISDS
appellate body members from both developed and developing
countries—or, in the modified proposal, members from high-income,
middle-income, and low-income countries—this proposal will ensure
that the members selected will be able to take into account the unique
problems confronting host states, including those in the developing
world. In doing so, the proposal will help address the concern about the
development bias to which Part I.C alluded.
The inclusion of members selected from developing countries—or, in
the modified proposal, middle-income and low-income countries—will
also enable the proposed ISDS appellate body to better understand the
complicated investment deals that many host states in the developing
world have struck. For instance, to compensate for their less-thanfavorable investment conditions, some host states may have offered to
investors free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export custom duties,
and preferential treatment on foreign exchange.122 Not only should these
concessions be taken into account in an investor-state dispute, but the
arbitral panel or the proposed ISDS appellate body should also take note
of the investors’ frustrations and demands before they entered the host
state.123 After all, those frustrations and demands are highly relevant to a
determination of the investors’ legitimate expectations and the minimum
standard of treatment they should have received under the agreement at
hand.
The final strength, which reinforces the earlier strengths, pertains to

122. See sources cited supra note 82.
123. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 892:
ISDS arbitrators should take those benefits into account if they are to obtain a more
complete picture of what attracts foreign intellectual property rights holders to invest in
the first place. After all, if intellectual property rights were as strong as the claimants
expected them to be, offsetting contributions would not have been needed in the first
place.
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transparency.124 One of the major criticisms of the ISDS mechanism is
that private arbitrators do not have any obligation to make the documents
involved in the dispute publicly accessible. The lack of transparency is
indeed why the TPP sought to improve the system by making arbitral
proceedings open and publicly accessible.125 Before its withdrawal from
the TPP, the United States also promised that the State Department’s
website would contain all submissions, hearing transcripts, and other key
documents regarding TPP-based ISDS cases against the United States.126
In addition, the EU proposal for the TTIP investment chapter calls for the
application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based
Investor-State Arbitration in its investment court system.127
Taking full advantage of these transparency-related improvements, the
current proposal will help ensure the public availability of a large trove
of ISDS documents and decisions for future consultation and utilization.
The greater transparency in this area, in turn, will help build trust and
legitimacy into ISDS. The availability of these documents and decisions
will also provide the much-needed technical assistance to those host
states that have limited resources in handling ISDS disputes, as well as to
those experts providing technical assistance.
124. See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 721, 761–62 (discussing the benefits of procedural transparency in
ISDS); Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 871 (noting that greater transparency in
ISDS “will ensure high-quality decision making while promoting democratic values, public
participation, accountability, and legitimacy”).
125. Article 9.24.1 of the TPP Agreement requires the host state to make publicly available the
following documents:
(a) the notice of intent;
(b) the notice of arbitration;
(c) pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and
any written submissions submitted pursuant to Article 9.23.2 (Conduct of the
Arbitration) and Article 9.23.3 and Article 9.28 (Consolidation);
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, if available; and
(e) orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal.
TPP Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.24.1.
126. See
USTR,
TPP
CHAPTER
SUMMARY—INVESTMENT
4
(2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Investment.pdf (“For investor-State
cases against the United States under TPP, all submissions, hearing transcripts, and other key
documents will be available on the U.S. State Department website.”).
127. See TTIP INVESTMENT CHAPTER PROPOSAL, supra note 7, § 3, art. 18(1) (stipulating the
application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules); Barnali Choudhury, 2015: The Year of
Reorienting International Investment Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/3/2015-year-reorienting-international-investmentlaw (“The EU’s proposal additionally ensures the applicability of the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules, meaning that many of the documents of the court’s process will be publicly available.”); see
also UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
(2014),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-ontransparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (providing the transparency rules).
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B. Limitations
Although this proposal features many strengths, it also comes with
some unavoidable limitations. The first limitation concerns the enormous
costs of ISDS. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (“OECD”), the costs of an ISDS arbitration “have
averaged over USD 8 million with costs exceeding USD 30 million in
some cases.”128 These costs could go up to as high as US$70 million, as
in the highly unusual case concerning Russia’s wrongful expropriation of
the now-defunct Yukos Oil, which was once the country’s biggest oil
producer.129
By streamlining the panel-selection process, this proposal—in
particular, its list of experts with demonstrated knowledge and experience
in issues concerning specific WTO obligations—is likely to save some
costs that would have been incurred by the delay in establishing arbitral
panels.130 A considerable part of the ISDS costs, however, will remain
because the current proposal will still allow investors and host states to
select arbitrators at the panel stage.
In addition, because this proposal introduces an appellate mechanism,
the extended time it will take to process the appeal will likely raise the
costs even further.131 In the WTO context, for example, Håkan
Nordström and Gregory Shaffer noted that the costs of a case of average
complexity will increase by about US$135,000 from US$420,000 if the
case is appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. 132 Likewise, Mallory
128. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 84, at 19; see also Matthew Hodgson, Costs in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Case for Reform, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note
34, at 748, 749 (footnotes omitted):
The average Party Costs for Claimants and Respondents are in the region of U.S. $4.4
million and U.S. $4.5 million, respectively. To this can be added average Tribunal Costs
of around U.S. $750,000. The average ‘all in’ costs of an investment treaty arbitration
are therefore just short of U.S. $10 million. The median figure is notably lower, but still
substantial, at around U.S. $6 million.
129. See JOUBIN-BRET, supra note 51, at 2 (stating that “the legal fees [in the Yukos Oil case]
for the claimant alone [were] US$ 70 million”).
130. See Monique Sasson, Investment Arbitration: Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 1288, 1321–22 (“The time to constitute the
tribunal varies between 90 days and 12 months and has been criticized as often being very timeconsuming.” (footnote omitted)).
131. See Schacherer, supra note 32, at 643 (“The biggest drawback is certainly that the
possibility for appeal adds costs and time to an already highly cost- and time-intensive dispute
settlement.”).
132. See Håkan Nordström & Gregory Shaffer, Access to Justice in the WTO: A Case for a
Small-Claims Procedure?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 205–06
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009):
Under . . . back-of-the-envelope calculations, a case of average complexity would cost
$100,000 if it ends after the initial consultations because the parties have settled or the
complaint is otherwise withdrawn. If the case advanced to the panel stage, it would cost
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Silberman observed in regard to an annulment proceeding: “If pursued all
the way through to a decision, [this] proceeding can add anywhere from
44 to 180 weeks to a proceeding, not to mention legal expenses ranging
from GBP83,345 [about US$125,000–130,000] to nearly U.S.$2.4
million.”133
The second limitation relates to the lack of finality at the panel stage.
For many investors, having the ability to quickly and efficiently resolve
a dispute with a sovereign state is one of the major attractions of ISDS. 134
Expedited action is indeed why many investors have favored this
mechanism over the domestic court process. Commentators have
therefore expressed concern that the introduction of an appellate
mechanism could undermine this key attraction of ISDS.135 After all, the
more steps there are in a process—appellate or otherwise—the longer it
will take for a dispute to be finally resolved.
Thus far, arbitral rules have varied considerably, with some
jurisdictions allowing arbitral awards to be appealed to local courts.136
For instance, in England and Wales, Section 69(1) of the Arbitration Act
another $320,000. And if the panel decision were appealed, the bill would rise by another
$135,000. The total cost would then top one-half of $1 million.
133. Mallory Silberman, ICSID Annulment Reform: Are We Looking at the Right Problem?, in
RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 853, 857 (footnotes omitted).
134. See Chester Brown & Kate Miles, Introduction: Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and
Arbitration, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note 72, at 3, 11 (“Investment
arbitration has, until recently, been characterised by an approach traditionally seen in international
commercial arbitration, being that of a simple desire for a quick and inexpensive decision to resolve
the dispute.”).
135. See Kalnina & Di Pietro, supra note 43, at 245–46 (“The main disadvantages [of the
creation of the ICSID Appeals Body] include jeopardy of the principle of finality, which has always
been considered among the main advantages of arbitration over judicial settlement . . . .”); Lee
Jaemin, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for International Investment Disputes:
Expected Benefits and Remaining Tasks, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 474,
493 (“The benefit of arbitration lies in the promptness of the proceedings; this should not be
undermined for the sake of having an appellate system.”); Park Eun Young, Appellate Review in
Investor State Arbitration, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra note 34, at 443, 444 (“[The]
emphasis on securing the finality of the award has contributed to timely and efficient enforcement
of awards.”); Thomas W. Walsh, Note, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for
Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 444, 446 (2006)
(“[A]lthough accuracy is a valid factor motivating the promotion of appeal, investors continue to
prefer finality and so there is insufficient interest to compel the adoption of the [ICSID] Appeals
Facility.”); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 53(1), 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]:
The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by
and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have
been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.
136. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 32, at 1551–54 (discussing judicial review of an
arbitral award).
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1996 stipulates, “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to
arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the
tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an award
made in the proceedings.”137 Likewise, Section 49(1) of the Singapore
Arbitration Act provides, “A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon
notice to the other parties and to the arbitral tribunal) appeal to the Court
on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings.”138
Ultimately, whether a proposal will receive widespread support,
including support from the international business and investment
communities,139 will depend on whether it succeeds in balancing
efficiency and expedition against fairness and legitimacy. Given the high
stakes involved in ISDS arbitrations and the related controversy and
opposition, having an appellate mechanism built into ISDS to ensure
greater fairness and legitimacy will make good practical sense.140 Such
improvement can also help increase its use in new areas, like intellectual
property.
137. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 69(1) (Eng.).
138. Arbitration Act, (2002) Cap. 10, § 49(1) (Sing.). Interestingly, at the time of Philip Morris’
ISDS case against Australia, this Act, which has since been amended, did not allow for a review of
a negative ruling on jurisdiction. Had Australia succeeded in changing the arbitral seat from
Singapore to London, see Philip Morris v. Australia Award, supra note 15, ¶ 26, the tobacco giant
might have been able to seek judicial review. See Antony Crockett & Daniel Mills, A Tale of Two
Cities: An Analysis of Divergent Approaches to Negative Jurisdictional Rulings, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/11/08/a-tale-of-two-cities-ananalysis-of-divergent-approaches-to-negative-jurisdictional-rulings/:
Under Singapore law—as it applied to the Arbitration—PMA [Philip Morris Asia] could
only challenge decisions of the Tribunal upholding jurisdiction; it had no ability to
challenge negative rulings on jurisdiction before the Singapore courts. Had the place of
the arbitration been London, however, PMA could have challenged the Tribunal’s
negative decision on jurisdiction under Section 30(2) of the English Arbitration Act
1996.
139. As one commentator observed:
Investor opinions are particularly important. Investors do not have the authority to alter
the ICSID Convention, but the Contracting States, which do, often advance the interests
of investors. Capital-exporting States do not generally conceive of themselves as
potential defendants in investor-State disputes; they primarily adopt an offensive view
of foreign investment law, promoting the rights of their investors. In contrast, capitalimporting States are aware that they may appear as defendants to an ICSID dispute.
However, they too promote investors’ interests with the hope of boosting foreign
investment flows. Even if capital-importing States do not choose to support investors’
interests, they cannot amend the Convention without the support of the capital-exporting
States.
Walsh, supra note 135, at 445 (footnote omitted).
140. See Schacherer, supra note 32, at 643 (“For the sake of good justice, considerations of
consistency and predictability are more important than finality.”); Yu, Investment-Related Aspects,
supra note 1, at 903 (“Given the high stakes involved in ISDS arbitrations and the arbitrations’
controversial nature and continuous opposition, having an appellate mechanism built into the ISDS
process to ensure greater fairness and legitimacy is eminently sensible.”).
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The third limitation pertains to the potential explosion of cases in the
appellate mechanism. Critics may ask, “what if all investors and host
states insisted on having their unfavorable ISDS decisions reviewed by
the proposed ISDS appellate body?” At the moment, arbitral awards
cannot be annulled except under a very limited set of circumstances.141
Nevertheless, if the losing party had a right to appeal, as provided in the
current proposal, there might be an explosion of appeals that ISDS has
not seen before. That explosion could easily undermine a lot of the
attractive strengths mentioned in Part III.A.
This type of criticism is actually quite common whenever a new
adjudicatory process is proposed. One process that immediately comes to
mind is the WTO dispute settlement process. When this process was first
mandated to address TRIPS disputes,142 commentators expressed
concern that a litigation explosion would emerge in the intellectual
property area once the TRIPS transition period for developing countries
expired.143 Concerns about a similar explosion were also expressed
141. Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention allows for an award to be annulled under one or
more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
ICSID Convention, supra note 135, art. 52(1). For discussions of proceedings to annul, review, or
set aside arbitral awards, see generally Vladimír Balaš, Review of Awards, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 34, at 1125; Jean-Christophe Honlet et al., ICSID Annulment, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 1431; Kalnina & Di Pietro, supra note 43;
Irmgard Marboe, ICSID Annulment Decisions: Three Generations Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 34, at 200; Lars Markert & Helene Bubrowski, National Setting
Aside Proceedings in Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW HANDBOOK,
supra note 34, at 1460; Nikolaos Tsolakidis, ICSID Annulment Standards: Who Has Finally Won
the Reisman v. Broches Debate of Two Decades Ago?, in RESHAPING THE ISDS SYSTEM, supra
note 34, at 828.
142. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 25, art. 64 (requiring that all disputes arising under the
TRIPS Agreement be settled by the WTO dispute settlement process); see also Peter K. Yu, The
Comparative Economics of International Intellectual Property Agreements, in COMPARATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMICS 282, 298 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2016) [hereinafter
Yu, Comparative Economics] (“Before the formation of the WTO, international intellectual
property agreements were largely unenforceable. Although both the Paris and Berne Conventions
contain an optional dispute settlement mechanism utilizing the International Court of Justice, no
country has ever used this mechanism to resolve an international intellectual property dispute.”
(footnote omitted)).
143. See Jerome Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation in
the Post-Transitional Phase?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADE, COMPETITION, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 115, 125 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003)
(“Seasoned observers already expect the number of dispute settlement actions to increase
exponentially once the developing countries lose their immunities, and the coalition of intellectual
property owners can hardly wait to bring test cases.”); Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked but
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regarding China’s accession to the WTO—not just in the intellectual
property area, but in all areas.144
Nevertheless, in the past twenty years, we have yet to see such an
explosion of WTO disputes with respect to either intellectual property or
China. In the intellectual property area, for example, there have been only
more than thirty requests for consultations, nine panel decisions, and
three Appellate Body reports.145 As to China, the country has been
involved in the WTO dispute settlement process only fifteen times as a
complainant and thirty-nine times as a respondent.146 Given the gap
between original fears and eventual developments, one cannot help but
wonder whether the fear for an ISDS explosion can be justified.
The fourth limitation regards the remaining substantive and procedural
flaws in ISDS. By making the mechanism more appealing than it is, this
proposal may actually make matters worse, as it will encourage investors
and host states to use the mechanism even though it continues to feature
many of the flaws documented by its critics.
While this criticism is understandable, the response will be quite
different depending on one’s view on the potential expansion of the use
of ISDS through bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements. If such
use does greatly expand, despite the repeated calls for its exclusion, our
options will be limited. Because the flaws in ISDS are unlikely to
disappear on their own, remediation will have to start somewhere—even
if we cannot address all the problems at the same time.
The final limitation involves the entrenchment of ISDS in the
intellectual property area. By improving the existing ISDS mechanism
Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
389 (2010) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked] (recalling that “one of the few opinions
both proponents and critics of TRIPS shared was that the WTO would see a flood of TRIPS
disputes”).
144. See Deborah Z. Cass, China and the “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law,
in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 40, 45 (Deborah
Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (noting the
concern that “China’s entry might weaken the dispute settlement system” by creating “noncompliance with Appellate Body rulings . . . [and an] overload of the dispute settlement system”).
But see Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: To Be and Not to Be—Is That the Answer?, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra, at 31, 38 (contending that “the issue of the
increasing litigiousness of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a broader issue that the
Chinese accession will amplify but does not create”).
145. See Yu, Comparative Economics, supra note 142, at 299 (“Since its inception more than
two decades ago, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body . . . has handed down three Appellate Body
Reports and nine panel reports on intellectual property disputes.”); see also Pauwelyn, The Dog
That Barked, supra note 143 (discussing the first fifteen years of the WTO dispute settlement
process).
146. Disputes by Member, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited July 26, 2017).
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and making it more appealing to investors and host states, this proposal
will welcome investment disputes into the intellectual property area,
thereby entrenching ISDS.
This line of criticism is particularly difficult to address, as I am not
only sympathetic to, but also in agreement with, those who believe
TRIPS-related issues should be addressed in the WTO system.147 Article
23.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding specifically provides,
“When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or
an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.”148
Moreover, the criticism about potential entrenchment is not
uncommon for proposals that advance middle-of-the-road solutions. One
may recall similar criticisms directed at Creative Commons many years
ago. By allowing “some rights reserved” under the copyright system—a
compromise between “all rights reserved” and “no rights reserved”—that
highly innovative proposal has threatened to entrench the copyright
147. See Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege, supra note 26, at 247 (“If investor-state disputes could
challenge TRIPS-consistent decisions, there is a risk of decisions inconsistent with the built-in
dispute resolution process of TRIPS.”); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Challenging Compliance with
International Intellectual Property Norms in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 19 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 241, 242 (2016) (“Generally, private right holders have no standing in fora where states can
adjudicate compliance with international IP norms (such as the WTO dispute settlement system).”).
Article 23.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides strong support for this position. See
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29, art. 23.1 (“When Members seek the redress of a
violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered
agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they
shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”). As the WTO
panel declared in United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Article 23.1 . . . prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all
Members to “have recourse to” the multilateral process set out in the DSU [Dispute
Settlement Understanding] when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these
circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to
the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of
WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call “exclusive dispute resolution
clause”, is an important new element of Members’ rights and obligations under the DSU.
Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the
dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to “abide by” the rules and procedures set
out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature:
when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.43, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/R (adopted Dec. 22, 1999); see also Simon Klopschinski, The WTOs DSU Article 23
as Guiding Principle for the Systemic Interpretation of International Investment Agreements in the
Light of TRIPs, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 211 (2016) (discussing how Article 23 may serve as a guiding
principle for the interpretation of international investment agreements in the light of the TRIPS
Agreement).
148. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 29, art. 23.1 (emphasis added).
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system whose problems it seeks to address. As Niva Elkin-Koren rightly
cautioned:
When Creative Commons relies on property rights to advance its
strategy, it reinforces the proprietary regime. Making copyright userfriendly is likely to bring more prevalence to property. This outcome,
however, will not necessarily promote access to works. If the purpose
of Creative Commons is to encourage sharing and collaboration in
creative processes, it has to offer an alternative regime. Simply letting
authors govern their own work may turn out to be self-defeating.149

In sum, the proposal advanced in this Article has a number of attractive
features. It also has a number of limitations, not to mention its inability
to fully address the many substantive and procedural problems that are
inherent in the ISDS mechanism. Thus, it is important to recognize that
this proposal is no panacea for the mechanism’s multiple defects. Instead,
the proposal is only one of many that aims to improve ISDS in the
intellectual property area. Addressing the mechanism’s other problems
will likely require the introduction of complementary safeguards and
adjustments.150 Two measures I have explored in an earlier article, but
am unable to cover here, are the establishment of an Advisory Center on
Investor-State Disputes151 and the development of a small-claims
procedure within the ISDS mechanism.152 Those two measures deserve
greater scholarly and policy attention.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, ISDS cases have begun to emerge in the
intellectual property area. Such emergence is problematic considering
that the current multilateral intellectual property system has been built
upon the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO dispute settlement process. The
149. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 401–02 (2005).
150. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 865–903 (discussing the various
substantive and procedural safeguards that the TPP Agreement has instituted to improve ISDS and
advancing proposals to provide further improvements).
151. See id. at 895–97 (calling for the establishment of this center); see also ADVISORY CENTRE
ON
WTO
LAW,
THE
SERVICES
OF
THE
ACWL
2
(n.d.),
http://www.acwl.ch/download/ql/Services_of_the_ACWL.pdf (discussing the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, based on which this proposal was created).
152. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 1, at 897–98 (calling for the development
of this procedure); see also Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement,
Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECON. 527, 536 (2000) (“Many cases that involve
developing countries will generally pertain to relatively small trade volumes. Another way of
recognising resource constraints is to consider adopting ‘light’ dispute settlement procedures for
‘small’ cases brought by developing countries (e.g., where the exports constitute less than one per
cent of apparent consumption in the importing market).”); Nordström & Shaffer, supra note 132,
at 191 (building the case for a small-claims procedure within the WTO).
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emergence of ISDS cases and the arrival of investment discussions
therefore have brought with them a clash of culture that is rarely seen in
the TRIPS-based system. To minimize this clash, this Article advances a
proposal that calls for greater crossfertilization between ISDS and the
WTO system.
As I noted at the outset, there are still many policymakers,
commentators, and civil society organizations that believe ISDS should
not be used in the intellectual property area, especially in relation to issues
falling squarely within the purview of the WTO dispute settlement
process. For those who take this position, the logical course of action is
not to push for this proposal, but to call for an exclusion of ISDS in the
proposed agreement—or, at least, the inclusion of an intellectual property
carve-out, similar to the carve-outs for financial services153 and tobaccocontrol measures in the TPP Agreement.154 However, for those who do
not take this position, this proposal can be quite attractive. This proposal
can also be of great interest to those eager to develop solutions to address
the potential clash between ISDS and the TRIPS Agreement regardless
of whether ISDS can be excluded from the intellectual property area.
Even though this proposal focuses on intellectual property—my
primary area of expertise—it could be easily expanded to address other
areas covered by WTO agreements, such as agriculture, textiles and
clothing, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The immediate goal
of this proposal is to address the many concerns and problems brought
153. See TPP Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.3.3 (stipulating that the TPP investment chapter
“shall not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party to the extent that they are covered
by Chapter 11 (Financial Services)”).
154. Article 29.5 of the TPP Agreement explicitly recognizes the health authorities’ ability to
introduce tobacco control measures:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) with
respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party. Such a claim shall
not be submitted to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has
made such an election. If a Party has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such
claims by the time of the submission of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of
Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the proceedings. For
greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits with respect to such claims, any such
claim shall be dismissed.
TPP Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29.5; see also Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—
Intellectual Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International
Investment Agreements, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 252, 272–75 (2015) (discussing the
difficulties in creating a carve-out for tobacco control measures at the TPP negotiations); Sean
Flynn, TPP Carve out for Tobacco Shows Core Flaws in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 1, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35107 (criticizing the inadequacy
of the TPP carve-out for tobacco control measures). See generally Matthew Rimmer, Plain
Packaging for the Pacific Rim—Tobacco Control and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 75 (Tania Voon ed., 2014) (discussing tobacco control
measures in relation to the TPP negotiations).
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about by the use of ISDS in the intellectual property area, but the
proposal’s ultimate goal is to use crossfertilization to preempt the
potential clash between ISDS and the WTO system. It therefore does not
matter whether the clash relates to the TRIPS Agreement or other WTO
agreements. Going in that direction, this Article could easily have been
titled Crossfertilizing ISDS with the WTO.

